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Abstract:  
This paper studies comparative risk aversion between risk averse agents in the 
presence of a background risk. Although the literature covers this question extensively, 
our contribution differs from most of the literature in two respects. First, background risk 
does not need to be additive or multiplicative. Second, the two risks are not necessary 
mean independent, and may be conditional expectation increasing or decreasing. We 
show that our order of cross Ross risk aversion is equivalent to the order of partial risk 
premium, while our index of decreasing cross Ross risk aversion is equivalent to 
decreasing partial risk premium.  These results generalize the comparative risk aversion 
model developed by Ross (1981) for mean independent risks. Finally, we show that 
decreasing cross Ross risk aversion gives rise to the utility function family belonging to 
the class of n-switch utility functions. 
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1 Introduction
Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964) propose an important theorem stating that risk aversion compar-
isons using risk premia and measures of risk aversion always give the same result. Ross (1981)
shows that when an agent faces more than one risky variable, Arrow-Pratt measures are not
strong enough to support the plausible association between absolute risk aversion and the size
of the risk premium. He proposes a stronger ordering called Ross risk aversion. Several studies
extend Ross' results. Most papers generalize them to higher-orders of risk aversion for univariate
utility functions (see Modica and Scarsini, 2005; Jindapon and Neilson, 2007; Li, 2009; Denuit
and Eeckhoudt, 2010a). This paper provides another direction to this line of research.
There is growing concern on risk attitudes of bivariate utility function in the literature (see
Bleichrodt et al., 2003; Eeckhoudt et al., 2007; Courbage and Rey, 2007; Menegatti, 2009 a,b;
Denuit and Eeckhoudt, 2010b; Li, 2011; Denuit et al., 2011a). To our knowledge, these studies
do not analyze comparative risk aversion. The rst paper that looks at preservation of \more risk
averse" with general multivariate preferences and background risk is Nachman (1982). However,
in his setting, the background risk is independent. Pratt (1988) also considers the comparison
of risk aversion both with and without the presence of an independent background risk using a
two-argument utility function.
We generalize the model of comparative risk aversion developed by Ross (1981). We introduce
the notion of cross Ross risk aversion and show that more cross Ross risk aversion is associated
with a higher partial risk premium in the presence of a conditional expectation increasing (or
decreasing) background risk. Hence, we demonstrate that the index of cross Ross risk aversion is
equivalent to the order of partial risk premium. We also propose the concept of decreasing cross
Ross risk aversion and derive necessary and sucient conditions for obtaining an equivalence
between decreasing cross Ross risk aversion and decreasing partial risk premium in the presence
of a conditional expectation increasing (or decreasing) background risk. We apply this result to
examine the eects of changes in wealth and nancial background risk on the intensity of risk
aversion. Finally, we show that specic assumptions about the behavior of the decreasing cross
Ross risk aversion gives rise to the utility function form that belongs to the class of n-switch
utility functions (Abbas and Bell, 2011).
Our paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 oer the necessary and sucient condi-
tions for comparing two agents' attitudes towards risk with dierent utility functions and the
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same agent's attitude at dierent wealth levels under a conditional expectation increasing (or
decreasing) background risk. Section 4 applies our results to nancial background risks. Sec-
tion 5 relates decreasing cross Ross risk aversion to n-switch independence property. Section 6
concludes the paper.
2 Comparative cross risk attitudes
We consider an economic agent whose preference for wealth, ~w and a random variable, ~y, can be
represented by a bivariate model of expected utility. We let u(w; y) denote the utility function,
and let u1(w; y) denote
@u
@w and u2(w; y) denote
@u
@y . We follow the same subscript convention for
the derivatives u11(w; y), u12(w; y) and so on, and assume that the partial derivatives required
for any denition all exist and are continuous.
Pratt (1990) and Chalfant and Finkelshtain (1993) introduce the following denition of
partial risk premia into the economic literature.
Denition 2.1 For u and v, the partial risk premia u and v for risk ~x in the presence of
risk ~y;are dened as
Eu(w + ~x; ~y) = Eu(w + E~x  u; ~y) (1)
and
Ev(w + ~x; ~y) = Ev(w + E~x  v; ~y): (2)
The partial risk premia u and v are the maximal monetary amounts individuals u and v
are willing to pay for removing one risk in the presence of a second risk. We derive necessary
and sucient conditions for comparative partial risk premia in the presence of a conditional
expectation increasing background risk. Extension of the analysis to conditional decreasing
background risk is discussed later. Let us introduce two denitions of comparative risk aversion
motivated by Ross (1981). The following denition uses  u12(w;y)u1(w;y) and 
v12(w;y)
v1(w;y)
as local measures
of correlation aversion.
Denition 2.2 u is more cross Ross risk averse than v if and only if there exists 1; 2 > 0
such that for all w; y and y0
u12(w; y)
v12(w; y)
 1  u1(w; y
0)
v1(w; y0)
(3)
and
u11(w; y)
v11(w; y)
 2  u1(w; y
0)
v1(w; y0)
: (4)
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The interpretation of the sign of the second mixed derivative goes back to De Finetti (1952)
and has been studied and extended by Epstein and Tanny (1980); Richard (1975); Scarsini
(1988) and Eeckhoudt et al. (2007). For example, Eeckhoudt et al. (2007) show that u12  0
is necessary and sucient for dening \correlation aversion", meaning that a higher level of the
second argument mitigates the detrimental eect of a reduction in the rst argument. An agent
is correlation averse if she always prefers a 50-50 gamble of a loss in wealth or a loss in the
second argument over another 50-50 gamble oering a loss in both arguments.
When u(w; y) = U(w + y) in (3) and (4), we obtain the denition of comparative Ross
risk aversion for mean independent risks. However, we are interested in comparisons when the
agents face two dependent risks which is more general than mean independence. We consider
the notion of conditional background risk. Two random variables are conditional risk dependent
when they are not mean independent.
Denition 2.3 ~y is a conditional background risk for ~x if E[~xj~y = y] 6= E [x].
The following proposition provides an equivalent comparison between risk aversion and par-
tial risk premium in the presence of conditional increasing background risks.
Proposition 2.1 For u, v with u1 > 0, v1 > 0, v11 < 0, u11 < 0, u12 < 0 and v12 < 0, the
following three conditions are equivalent:
(i) u is more cross Ross risk averse than v.
(ii) There exists  : R  R ! R with 1  0, 12  0 and 11  0, and  > 0 such that
u = v + .
(iii) u  v for 8 w and (~x; ~y) such that E[~xj~y = y] is non-decreasing in y.
Proof See the Appendix.
When an agent faces a conditional expectation increasing background risk, the cross Ross
risk aversion relationship establishes an unambiguous equivalence between more risk aversion
and a larger partial risk premium.
3 Decreasing cross Ross risk aversion with respect to wealth
In this section, we examine how the partial risk premium for a given risk ~x is aected by a
change in initial wealth w, in the presence of a dependent background risk. Fully dierentiating
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equation (1) with respect to w yields1
Eu1(w + ~x; ~y) = Eu1(w + E~x  u; ~y)  0(w)Eu1(w + E~x  u; ~y); (5)
hence,
0(w) =
Eu1(w +E~x  u; ~y)  Eu1(w + ~x; ~y)
Eu1(w + E~x  u; ~y) : (6)
Thus, the partial risk premium is decreasing in wealth if and only if
Eh(w + E~x  u; ~y)  Eh(w + ~x; ~y); (7)
where h   u1 is dened as minus the partial derivative of function u. Since h1 =  u11  0,
condition (7) then just states that the partial risk premium of agent h is larger than the partial
risk premium of agent u. From Proposition 2.1, this is true if and only if h is more cross Ross
risk averse than u. That is, 91; 2 > 0, for all w,y and y0, such that
h12(w; y)
u12(w; y)
 1  h1(w; y
0)
u1(w; y0)
(8)
and
h11(w; y)
u11(w; y)
 2  h1(w; y
0)
u1(w; y0)
; (9)
or, equivalently,
 u112(w; y)
u12(w; y)
 1   u11(w; y
0)
u1(w; y0)
(10)
and
 u111(w; y)
u11(w; y)
 2   u11(w; y
0)
u1(w; y0)
: (11)
Proposition 3.1 introduces  u112(w;y)u11(w;y) and  
u111(w;y)
u11(w;y)
as local measurements of cross-prudence
and prudence. These local measures of prudence are essentially identical to the measure proposed
by Kimball (1990). It is well known that, for the single-risk case, DARA is equivalent to the
utility function  u0(:) being more concave than u(:) (see for example, Gollier, 2001). Proposition
3.1 is an extension of this result to bivariate risks under a conditional expectation increasing
background risk.
We obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 3.1 For u with u1 > 0, u11 < 0, u12 < 0, u111  0 and u112  0, the following
three conditions are equivalent:
1Equation (5) has a univariate counterpart in Eeckhoudt and Kimball (1992).
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(i) the partial risk premium u; associated with any (~x; ~y) such that E[~xj~y = y] is non-
decreasing in y, is decreasing in wealth;
(ii) There exists  : R  R ! R with 1  0, 12  0 and 11  0, and  > 0 such that
 u1 = u+ ;
(iii) 91; 2 > 0, for all w, y and y0, such that
 u112(w; y)
u12(w; y)
 1   u11(w; y
0)
u1(w; y0)
(12)
and
 u111(w; y)
u11(w; y)
 2   u11(w; y
0)
u1(w; y0)
: (13)
The proof of Proposition 3.1 is obtained by (5) to (11).
An interpretation of the sign of u112 is provided by Eeckhoudt et al. (2007), who showed
that u112 > 0 is a necessary and sucient condition for \cross-prudence in its second argument",
meaning that a higher level of second argument mitigates the detrimental eect of the monetary
risk.
There are economic applications where negative dependence is more convenient. If E[~xj~y = y]
is non-increasing in y, then E[ ~xj~y = y] is non-decreasing in y. We can dene u(x; y) = u( x; y)
and v(x; y) = v( x; y). Then Propositions 2.1 and 3.1 can be extended to u(x; y) and v(x; y)
directly. More specically, we can propose the following results.
Proposition 3.2 For u, v with u1 > 0, v1 > 0, u11 < 0, v11 < 0, u12 < 0 and v12 < 0, the
following three conditions are equivalent:
(i) u is more cross Ross risk averse than v.
(ii) There exists  : R  R ! R with 1  0, 12  0 and 11  0, and  > 0 such that
u = v + .
(iii) u  v for 8 w and (~x; ~y) such that E[~xj~y = y] is non-increasing in y.
and
Proposition 3.3 For u with u1 > 0, u11 < 0, u12 < 0, u111  0 and u112  0, the following
three conditions are equivalent:
(i) the partial risk premium u associated with any (~x; ~y) such that E[~xj~y = y] is non-
increasing in y, is decreasing in wealth;
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(ii) There exists  : R  R ! R with 1  0, 12  0 and 11  0, and  > 0 such that
 u1 = u+ ;
(iii) 91; 2 > 0, for all w, y and y0, such that
  u112(w; y)
u12(w; y)
 1    u11(w; y
0)
u1(w; y0)
(14)
and
  u111(w; y)
u11(w; y)
 2    u11(w; y
0)
u1(w; y0)
: (15)
4 Comparative risk aversion in the presence of a nancial back-
ground risk
In the economic literature, the nancial background risk has received much attention. For ad-
ditive nancial background risk, we refer to Doherty and Schlesinger (1983a,b, 1986), Kischka
(1988), Eeckhoudt and Kimball (1992), Eeckhoudt and Gollier, (2000), Schlesinger (2000), Gol-
lier (2001), Eeckhoudt et al. (2007) and Franke et al. (2011). For multiplicative nancial
background risk, see Franke et al. (2006, 2011). In this section, we consider some examples
to illustrate the use of Propositions 2.1 and 3.1 in the framework of additive or multiplicative
background risks.
4.1 Additive background risk
First, we show that Proposition 2.1 allows us to extend the results of Ross (1981) for an additive
background risk. Note that, for an additive background risk ~y, we have
u(w; y) = U(w + y) (16)
and
v(w; y) = V (w + y): (17)
Here w can be interpreted as the random wealth of an agent and y as a random increment to
wealth, i.e., random income or nancial portfolio.
Since,
u1 = U
0 ; u11 = u12 = U 00 and u111 = u112 = U 000 (18)
and
v1 = V
0 ; v11 = v12 = V 00 and v111 = v112 = V 000: (19)
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Ross (1981) proposed the following results
Proposition 4.1 (Ross (1981, Theorem 3)) For u(w; y) = U(w + y), v(w; y) = V (w + y) with
U 0 > 0, V 0 > 0, U 00 < 0 and V 00 < 0, the following two conditions are equivalent:
(i) 9 > 0
U 00(w + y)
V 00(w + y)
   U
0(w + y0)
V 0(w + y0)
for all w ; y and y0: (20)
(ii) u  v for 8 w, any zero-mean risk ~x and ~y with E[~xj~y = y] = E~x = 0.
Proposition 4.2 (Ross (1981, Theorem 4)) For u(w; y) = U(w + y), with U 0 > 0, U 00 < 0 and
U 000 > 0, the partial risk premium associated to any zero-mean risk ~x with E[~xj~y = y] = 0 is
decreasing in wealth if and only if, 9 > 0, for all w, y and y0,
 U
000(w + y)
U 00(w + y)
    U
00(w + y0)
U 0(w + y0)
(21)
We now show that corollaries 4.2 and 4.3 generalize Ross' conditions.
Conditions (3) and (4) imply
U 00(w + y)
V 00(w + y)
   U
0(w + y0)
V 0(w + y0)
for all w ; y and y0: (22)
Then, Proposition 2.1, (18), (19) and (22) immediately entail the following result.
Corollary 4.3 For u(w; y) = U(w + y), v(w; y) = V (w + y) with U 0 > 0, V 0 > 0, U 00 < 0 and
V 00 < 0, the following two conditions are equivalent:
(i) 9 > 0
U 00(w + y)
V 00(w + y)
   U
0(w + y0)
V 0(w + y0)
for all w ; y and y0: (23)
(ii) u  v for 8 w and (~x; ~y) such that E[~xj~y = y] is non-decreasing in y.
Conditions (14) and (15) imply, for all w, y and y0,
 U
000(w + y)
U 00(w + y)
    U
00(w + y0)
U 0(w + y0)
(24)
From Proposition 3.1, (18), (19) and (22), we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 4.4 For u(w; y) = U(w + y), with U 0 > 0, U 00 < 0 and U 000 > 0, the following two
conditions are equivalent:
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(i) the partial risk premium associated with any (~x; ~y) such that E[~xj~y = y] is non-decreasing
in y, is decreasing in wealth.
(ii) 9 > 0, for all w, y and y0,
 U
000(w + y)
U 00(w + y)
    U
00(w + y0)
U 0(w + y0)
(25)
In Corollary 4.4, the condition for decreasing risk premia under conditional expectation
increasing risks is equivalent to that for a rst-order stochastic dominance (FSD) improvement
in an independent background risk to decrease the risk premium, as shown by Eeckhoudt et al.
(1996).
4.2 Multiplicative background risk
For a multiplicative background risk ~y, we have
u(w; y) = U(wy) (26)
and
v(w; y) = V (wy): (27)
Here w may represent the random wealth invested in a risky asset and y may represent a
multiplicative random shock on random wealth.
Since,
u1 = yU
0; u11 = y2U 00; u12 = U 0 + wyU 00; u111 = y3U 000 and u112 = 2yU 002U 000 (28)
and
v1 = yV
0; v11 = y2V 00; v12 = V 0 + wyV 00; v111 = y3V 000 and v112 = 2yV 002V 000: (29)
Conditions (3) and (4) imply, 91; 2 > 0, for all w, y and y0,
U 0(wy) + wyU 00(wy)
V 0(wy) + wyV 00(wy)
 1  U
0(wy0)
V 0(wy0)
(30)
and
U 00(wy)
V 00(wy)
 2  U
0(wy0)
V 0(wy0)
: (31)
Then, from Proposition 2.1, (28), (29), (30) and (31), we obtain
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Corollary 4.5 For u(w; y) = U(wy), v(w; y) = V (wy) with U 0 > 0, V 0 > 0, U 00 < 0 and
V 00 < 0, the following two conditions are equivalent:
(i) 91; 2 > 0, for all w,y and y0,
U 0(wy) + wyU 00(wy)
V 0(wy) + wyV 00(wy)
 1  U
0(wy0)
V 0(wy0)
(32)
and
U 00(wy)
V 00(wy)
 2  U
0(wy0)
V 0(wy0)
: (33)
(ii) u  v for 8 w and (~x; ~y) such that E[~xj~y = y] is non-decreasing in y.
Since
U 0(wy) + wyU 00(wy)
V 0(wy) + wyV 00(wy)
(34)
=
U 00(wy)( U
0(wy)
U 00(wy) + wy)
V 00(wy)( V
0(wy)
V 00(wy) + wy)
=
U 00(wy)(wy   1RAU (wy))
V 00(wy)(wy   1RAV (wy))
;
where RAU (wy) =  U
00(wy)
U 0(wy) and RAV (wy) =  V
00(wy)
V 0(wy) are indices of absolute risk aversion. We
can obtain a more short cut sucient condition from Corollary 4.5.
Corollary 4.6 For u(w; y) = U(wy), v(w; y) = V (wy) with w > 0, ~y > 0 almost surely, U 0 > 0,
V 0 > 0, U 00 < 0 and V 00 < 0, If 9 > 0, for all w,y and y0,
U 00(wy)
V 00(wy)
   U
0(wy0)
V 0(wy0)
; (35)
then u  v for 8 w and (~x; ~y) such that E[~xj~y = y] is non-decreasing in y.
Proof From the above argument, we know that for all w,y and y0,
U 00(wy)
V 00(wy)
   U
0(wy0)
V 0(wy0)
: (36)
RAU (wy)  RAV (wy) implies that u  v for 8 w and (~x; ~y) such that E[~xj~y = y] is non-
decreasing in y. Using the fact that \U is more Ross risk averse than V ) RAU (wy) 
RAV (wy)", we obtain the result. Q.E.D.
Corollary 4.5 states that \more Ross risk aversion" is a sucient condition to order partial
risk premium in the presence of conditional expectation increasing multiplicative background
risk.
From Proposition 3.1, we obtain
9
Corollary 4.7 For u(w; y) = U(wy), with U 0 > 0, U 00 < 0 and U 000 > 0, the partial risk
premiums associated with any (~x; ~y) such that E[~xj~y = y] is non-decreasing in y, is decreasing
in wealth if and only if, 91; 2 > 0, for all w,y and y0,
  2yU
002U 000(wy)
U 0(wy) + wyU 00(wy)
 1   y
0U 00(wy0)
U 0(wy0)
(37)
and
 yU
000(wy)
U 00(wy)
 2   y
0U 00(wy0)
U 0(wy0)
: (38)
Since
  2yU
002U 000(wy)
U 0(wy) + wyU 00(wy)
(39)
=  
yU 000(wy)(2 U
00(wy)
U 000(wy) + wy)
U 00(wy)( U
0(wy)
U 00(wy) + wy)
=  
yU 000(wy)(wy   2 1PU (wy))
U 00(wy)(wy   1RAU (wy))
;
where PU (wy) =  U
000(wy)
U 00(wy) is the index of absolute prudence. We can obtain a shorter sucient
condition from Corollary 4.7.
Corollary 4.8 For u(w; y) = U(wy), with w > 0, ~y > 0 almost surely, U 0 > 0, U 00 < 0
and U 000 > 0, The partial risk premium associated with any risk (~x; ~y) such that E[~xj~y = y] is
non-decreasing in y, is decreasing in wealth if , 9 > 0, for all w, y and y0,
 yU
000(wy)
U 00(wy)
    y
0U 00(wy0)
U 0(wy0)
(40)
and PU (wy)  2RAU (wy).
Moreover, (40) can be multiplied by w on both sides to obtain the results in terms of measures
of relative risk aversion and relative prudence:
 wyU
000(wy)
U 00(wy)
    wy
0U 00(wy0)
U 0(wy0)
; (41)
which implies \min relative prudence  max relative risk aversion". Whereas in the literature,
PU  2RAU is an important condition for risk vulnerability (see Gollier 2001, p129), Corollary
4.8 shows that minPU  maxRAU is an important condition for comparative risk aversion in
the presence of a conditional expectation increasing multiplicative background risk.
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5 Decreasing cross Ross risk aversion and n-switch indepen-
dence property
Because the conditions derived in Ross (1981) are fairly restrictive upon preference, some read-
ers may regard Ross' results as negative, because no standard utility functions (logarithmic,
power, mixture of exponentials) satisfy these conditions. Pratt (1990) suggests that probabil-
ity distributions restrictions stronger than mean independence may provide more satisfactory
comparative statics. On a very dierent ground, Bell (1988) proposes that agents are likely to
be characterized by a utility function satisfying the one-switch rule: there exists at most one
unique critical wealth level at which the decision-maker switches from preferring one alternative
to the other. He shows that the linex function (linear plus exponential) is the only relevant
utility function family if one adds to the one-switch rule some very reasonable requirements.
Such utility function has been studied by Bell and Fishburn (2001), Sandvik and Thorlund-
Petersen (2010) and Abbas and Bell (2011). In a recent paper, Denuit et al. (2011b) show that
Ross' stronger measure of risk aversion gives rise to the linex utility function and therefore they
provide not only a utility function family but also some intuitive and convenient properties for
Ross' measure.
Abbas and Bell (2011) extend the one-switch independence property to two-attribute utility
functions and propose a new independence assumption based on the one-switch property: n-
switch independence.
Denition 5.1 (Abbas and Bell 2011) For utility function u(x; y),X is n-switch independent
of Y if two gamblers ~x1 and ~x2 can switch in preference at most n times as Y progresses from
its lowest to its highest value.
They provide the following propositions:
Proposition 5.1 (Abbas and Bell 2011) X is one-switch independent of Y if and only if
u(x; y) = g0(y) + f1(x)g1(y) + f1(x)g2(y); (42)
where g1(y) has constant sign, and g2(y) = g1(y)(y) for some monotonic function .
Proposition 5.2 (Abbas and Bell 2011) If X is n-switch independent of Y , then there exist
some functions fi, gi such that
u(x; y) = g0(y) +
n+1X
i=1
fi(x)gi(y): (43)
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We now show that the one-switch property of Proposition 5.1 is a consequence of Proposition
3.1. We also argue that (43) is a utility function that satises the decreasing cross Ross risk
aversion condition proposed in Section 3.
From Proposition 3.1 we know that the partial risk premium u, associated with any (~x; ~y)
such that E[~xj~y = y] is non-decreasing in y, is decreasing in wealth, if and only if there exists
 : RR! R with 1  0, 12  0 and 11  0, and  > 0 such that
 u1(x; y) = u(x; y) + (x; y): (44)
Solving the above dierential equation implies that u is of the form
u(x; y) =  
Z x
 1
et(t; y)dte x: (45)
If we take (x; y) =  H(x)J(y) such that J(y) has a constant sign, then we get
u(x; y) =
Z x
 1
etH(t)dte xJ(y) (46)
= [
1

exH(x)  1

Z x
 1
etH 0(t)dt]e xJ(y)
=
1

H(x)J(y)  1

Z x
 1
etH 0(t)dte xJ(y):
Dening g1(y) = g2(y) =
1
J(y), f1(x) = H(x) and f2(x) =  
R x
 1 e
tH 0(t)dte x, then we
recognize the functional form in Proposition 5.1.
Integrating the integral term of (46) by parts again and again, we obtain
u(x; y) =
nX
i=1
ex
( 1)i 1H(i 1)(x)
i
+
1
n
Z x
 1
et( 1)nH(n)(t)dt]e xJ(y) (47)
=
nX
i=1
J(y)
( 1)i 1H(i 1)(x)
i
+
1
n
Z x
 1
et( 1)nH(n)(t)dte xJ(y)
=
n+1X
i=1
fi(x)gi(y);
where fi(x) = ( 1)(i 1)H(i 1)(x) for i = 1; :::; n, fn+1(x) =
R x
 1 e
t( 1)nH(n)(t)dte x, gi(y) =
1
i
J(y) for i = 1; ::; n and gn+1(y) =
1
nJ(y). Therefore we obtain the functional form in
Proposition 5.2 from decreasing cross Ross risk aversion. Although coming from very dierent
approaches, decreasing cross Ross risk aversion and n-switch independence reach the same func-
tional form. Our result thus provides a connection between decreasing cross Ross risk aversion
and n-switch independence.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper we consider expected-utility preferences in a bivariate setting. The analysis focuses
on random variables that satisfy the conditional expectation dependence. The main focus is on
the risk premium for removing one of the risks in the presence of a second risk. To this end, we
extend Ross' (1981) contribution by dening the concept of \cross Ross risk aversion." We derive
several equivalence theorems relating measures of risk premia with measures of risk aversion.
We then consider additive risks and multiplicative risks as two special cases. We also show that
decreasing cross Ross risk aversion assumption about behavior gives rise to the utility function
family that belongs to the class of n-switch utility functions. The analysis and the index of
risk aversion in this paper may be instrumental in obtaining comparative static predictions in
various applications.
7 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 2.1
Proof (i) implies (ii): We note that
u12(w; y)
v12(w; y)
 1  u1(w; y
0)
v1(w; y0)
,  u12(w; y) v12(w; y)  1 
u1(w; y
0)
v1(w; y0)
: (48)
u11(w; y)
v11(w; y)
 2  u1(w; y
0)
v1(w; y0)
,  u11(w; y) v11(w; y)  2 
u1(w; y
0)
v1(w; y0)
: (49)
Dening  = u   v, where  = minf1; 2g, and dierentiating, one obtains 1 = u1   v1,
12 = u12   v12 and 11 = u11   v11 , then (48) and (49) imply that 1  0, 12  0 and
11  0.
(ii) implies (iii): From Theorem 2 of Finkelshtain et al. (1999), we know that,
(a) 11  0 and 12  0 , E(w + ~x; ~y)  E(w + E~x; ~y) for any risk (~x; ~y) such that
E[~xj~y = y] is non-decreasing in y;
(b) when v1  0, v11  0 and v12  0 if and only if v  0 for any risk (~x; ~y) such that
E[~xj~y = y] is non-decreasing in y.
Since v  0, we have 1  0) (w; y)  (w   v; y).
The following proof is as in Ross (1981):
Eu(w + E~x  u; ~y) = Eu(w + ~x; ~y) (50)
= E[v(w + ~x; ~y) + (w + ~x; ~y)]
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= Ev(w + E~x  v; ~y) + E(w + ~x; ~y)
 Ev(w + E~x  v; ~y) + E(w + E~x; ~y)
 Ev(w + E~x  v; ~y) + E(w + E~x  v; ~y)
= Eu(w + E~x  v; ~y):
Since u1 > 0, u  v.
(iii) implies (i): We prove this claim by contradiction. Suppose that there exists some w, y
and y0 such that u12(w;y)v12(w;y) <
u1(w;y0)
v1(w;y0) . Because u1, v1, u12 and v12 are continuous, we have
u12(w; y)
v12(w; y)
<
u1(w; y
0)
v1(w; y0)
for (w; y); (w; y0) 2 [m1;m2] [n1; n2]; (51)
which implies
 u12(w; y)
 v12(w; y) <
u1(w; y
0)
v1(w; y0)
for (w; y); (w; y0) 2 [m1;m2] [n1; n2]; (52)
and then
v1(w; y
0)
 v12(w; y) <
u1(w; y
0)
 u12(w; y) for (w; y); (w; y
0) 2 [m1;m2] [n1; n2]: (53)
If G(x; y) is a distribution function and GY (y) is the marginal distribution function of ~y. such
that GY (y) has positive support on interval [n1; n2] then we have
Ev1(w; ~y)
 v12(w; y) <
Eu1(w; ~y)
 u12(w; y) for (w; y) 2 [m1;m2] [n1; n2]; (54)
which can be written as
u12(w; y)
Eu1(w; ~y)
>
v12(w; y)
Ev1(w; ~y)
for (w; y) 2 [m1;m2] [n1; n2]: (55)
Let us consider w0 2 [m1;m2] and ~x = k~z with k > 0, where ~z is a zero-mean risk with a
distribution function G(z; y) such that GZ(~z  zj~y = y) is non-increasing in y. We notice that
(a) GZ(~z  zj~y = y) is non-increasing in y ) E[~zj~y = y]; is non-decreasing in y;
(b) GZ(~z  zj~y = y) is non-increasing in y ) G(~y  y; ~z  z)  GY (~y  y)GZ(~z  z) (see
Lehmann 1966, Lemma 4).
Let u(k) denote its associated partial risk premium, which is
Eu(w0 + k~z; ~y) = Eu(w0   u(k); ~y): (56)
Dierentiating the above equality with respect to k yields
E~zu1(w0 + k~z; ~y) =  0u(k)Eu1(w0   u(k); ~y): (57)
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Observing that u(0) = 0, we get
0u(0) =  
E~zu1(w0; ~y)
Eu1(w0; ~y)
(58)
=  E~zEu1(w0; ~y) + Cov(~z; u1(w0; ~y))
Eu1(w0; ~y)
=  Cov(~z; u1(w0; ~y))
Eu1(w0; ~y)
=  
R R
[G(z; y) GZ(z)GY (y)]dzdyu1(w0; y)
Eu1(w0; ~y)
(by Cuadras 2002; Theorem 1)
=  
Z Z
[G(z; y) GZ(z)GY (y)] u12(w0; y)
Eu1(w0; ~y)
dzdy
Similarly, for v we have
0v(0) =  
Z Z
[G(z; y) GZ(z)GY (y)] v12(w0; y)
Ev1(w0; ~y)
dzdy: (59)
Now u and v can be written as the forms of Taylor expansion around k = 0:
u(k) =  k
Z Z
[G(z; y) GZ(z)GY (y)] u12(w0; y)
Eu1(w0; ~y)
dzdy + o(k) (60)
and
v(k) =  k
Z Z
[G(z; y) GZ(z)GY (y)] v12(w0; y)
Ev1(w0; ~y)
dzdy + o(k): (61)
Then, from (55), we know that, when k ! 0, we get u < v for G(z; y) such that GY (y) has
positive support on interval [n1; n2] and G(z; y) GZ(z)GY (y) is positive on domain [m1;m2]
[n1; n2]. This is a contradiction.
Now let us turn to the other condition. Suppose that there exists some w, y and y0 such
that u11(w;y)v11(w;y) <
u1(w;y0)
v1(w;y0) . Because u1, v1, u11 and v11 are continuous, we have
u11(w; y)
v11(w; y)
<
u1(w; y
0)
v1(w; y0)
for (w; y); (w; y0) 2 [m01;m02] [n01; n02]; (62)
which implies
 u11(w; y)
 v11(w; y) <
u1(w; y
0)
v1(w; y0)
for (w; y); (w; y0) 2 [m01;m02] [n01; n02]; (63)
and then
 u11(w; y)
u1(w; y0)
<
 v11(w; y)
v1(w; y0)
for (w; y); (w; y0) 2 [m01;m02] [n01; n02]: (64)
If G(x; y) is a distribution function such that GY (y) has positive support on interval [n
0
1; n
0
2],
then we have
 Eu11(w; ~y)
u1(w; y0)
<
 Ev11(w; ~y)
v1(w; y0)
for (w; y0) 2 [m01;m02] [n01; n02] (65)
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and
 Eu11(w; ~y)
Eu1(w; ~y)
<
 Ev11(w; ~y)
Ev1(w; ~y)
: (66)
Let us consider w0 2 [m01;m02] and ~x = k~z, where ~z is a zero-mean risk and ~z and ~y are
independent. Let u(k) denote its associated partial risk premium, which is
Eu(w0 + k~z; ~y) = Eu(w0   u(k); ~y): (67)
Dierentiating the equality above with respect to k yields
E~zu1(w0 + k~z; ~y) =  0u(k)Eu1(w0   u(k); ~y); (68)
and so 0u(0) = 0 since E~z = 0. Dierentiating once again with respect to k yields
E~z2u11(w0 + k~z; ~y) = [
02
u Eu11(w0   u(k); ~y)  00u(k)Eu1(w0   u(k); ~y): (69)
This implies that
00u(0) =  
Eu11(w0; ~y)
Eu1(w0; ~y)
E~z2: (70)
Similarly, for v we have
00v (0) =  
Ev11(w0; ~y)
Ev1(w0; ~y)
E~z2: (71)
Now u and v can be written as the forms of Taylor expansion around k = 0:
u(k) =  Eu11(w0; ~y)
Eu1(w0; ~y)
E~z2k2 + o(k2) (72)
and
v(k) =  Ev11(w0; ~y)
Ev1(w0; ~y)
E~z2k2 + o(k2): (73)
From (66) we know that, when k ! 0, we get u < v for G(x; y) such that GY (y) has positive
support on interval [n01; n02]. This is a contradiction. Q.E.D.
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